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Abstract
Entrepreneurial action is increasingly associated
with innovation ecosystems because no firm alone can
render the complex and interdependent services
demanded in markets. Moreover, entrepreneurial firms
are increasingly instigators of innovation ecosystems,
rather than merely participants. However, particularly
in the pursuit of radical innovation, a question arises
as to how an entrepreneurial firm begins to form and
shape the landscape for an emergent ecosystem. In this
paper, we examine the innovation activities of Formula
E, a new venture at the hub of an emerging ecosystem,
aiming to transform motorsports for digital-native
fans. Digital technologies are providing nearly
boundless possibilities but represent uncertain
opportunities in terms of their ability to engage young
fans, who previously have shown little interest in
motorsports. We identify probing as a way to use
initiatives to provoke engagement and generate openended dialog and discussion. Entrepreneurial probing
helps to expand the innovation landscape in search of
heterogeneous need-solution pairs.

1. Introduction
Digitization has rendered entrepreneurial action
complex and collaborative [1]. Entrepreneurial action
refers to organizing and operating activities of a
business venture as it takes risks in discovering,
evaluating, and exploiting opportunities [2]. No
entrepreneurial firm can control all the resources and
their integration, particularly when innovation is
targeted at digital services and experiences [3].
Innovation requires both dynamic relationships with
diverse partners across industry boundaries and
knowledge collaboration in user communities [4].
Consequently, entrepreneurial action is less confined to
the cognitive and emotional capacities of a single
entrepreneur, an intact team of entrepreneurs, or even a
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stable set of alliance relationships. To organize
entrepreneurial action in digital service ecosystems,
collaboration needs to transcend producer–consumer
divides [3]. In digital service innovation, users become
critical business partners as co-creators of these
experiences.
Ecosystems are constellations that bring together
diverse partners across different industries to “coevolve capabilities around a new innovation: They
work cooperatively and competitively to support new
products, satisfy customer needs, and eventually
incorporate the next round of innovations” [5, p. 76].
Innovation ecosystems are recognized as an important
context for entrepreneurial action that seeks to leverage
digital technologies [6], [7]. However, the prevailing
focus in the literature has been on entrepreneurial firms
as participants and complementors and not as anchors
instigating, leading, and orchestrating ecosystems [8]–
[10].
How does an entrepreneurial firm grow an
ecosystem for radical innovation? Radical innovation
implies radical departures from existing practices,
business models, market categories, or customer
groups. To pursue such radical opportunities in an
ecosystem requires an entrepreneurial firm to take
significant risks and venture into landscapes where
“you don’t know what you don’t know.” The
entrepreneurial firm has to constantly play, poke, and
shape the contours (limits) of the landscape to attract
new partners and user communities.
Von Hippel and von Krogh [11] argue that in
highly uncertain environments, informal and broad
parallel external searches of need–solution pairs can be
more cost effective than the traditional practice of
engaging first in problem formulation in advance of
“solving” the problem. But the broad search assumes a
rich landscape with lots of different locations for
opportunities.
The
entrepreneurial
literature
acknowledges that opportunities are endogenously
created by the enactment of entrepreneurs [12].
Entrepreneurial action can target social trends and
changes in user profiles and behaviors [1]. The
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equifinality of digital technologies also suggests that a
range of technologies can be competing to meet the
user or customer need [13]. All this speaks to the
potential for an entrepreneurial firm to cultivate a rich
landscape for an ecosystem where a heterogeneous set
of opportunities can be present.
We examined the early-stage entrepreneurial
ecosystem of a new venture, Formula E (FE), in the
sports entertainment industry. The ecosystem
comprised of diverse partner firms, along with fluid
and diverse user communities. The venture sought to
become the hub of an ecosystem that would disrupt the
motorsports world by leveraging digital technology,
transforming how the sport is experienced, played, and
defined. FE was targeting the next generation of fans,
millennials, who had previously shown little interest in
motorsports. While an abundance of digital
technologies was unceasingly emerging, which digital
technologies would be appropriate in this digital
transformation was uncertain.
FE, in close collaboration with ecosystem partners,
launched a diverse array of digital experiences and
applications enabled by mobile, social, virtual reality,
gaming, crowdsourcing, and connected and
autonomous car technologies. With these initiatives,
which were co-created with fans and business partners,
the venture began to poke and shape the limits of the
innovation landscape: (1) how sports fans would want
to engage in digital experiences; (2) how sports would
be played/performed; and (3) how new sport
competitions and categories could be invented. The
initiatives became hotspots for the meaning-making of
innovative possibilities, but also generated tensions and
different perspectives among different actors in the
ecosystem. In the process, both the uncertainties and
the landscape of opportunities for the ecosystem
increased.
Our contribution is positioned as complementing
existing literature on ecosystems, radical innovation,
and entrepreneurial opportunity creation. We examine
radical initiatives of an entrepreneurial firm with
limited resources and discover the notion of probing as
a way to expand the landscape for its ecosystem.
Probing is both deliberate and emergent: it is deliberate
in terms of provocation; it is emergent in terms of
engaging in continuous discussions.
Similar to what is written about cultural probes in
the human-computer interaction literature, the
initiatives at FE probed surprises and challenged
“thoughts and assumptions about people and situations
being designed for” [14, p. 57]. While cultural probes
focus on demand-side reactions [14], the initiatives we
analyzed were poking on both the demand and supply
side under high levels of uncertainty in search of needsolution pairs [11]. We introduce the term

“entrepreneurial probing” because it is used to expand
the landscape for innovation opportunities. New
opportunities attract new business partners and user
communities to join and form new configurations in
co-creating experiences.
Next, we review concepts of ecosystems, radical
innovation, and entrepreneurial opportunity creation.
We then report on our empirical study. We conclude
the paper with a discussion of probing as a way to
grow and shape the innovation landscape for the
entrepreneurial ecosystem.

2. Theoretical Background
We briefly review literature on ecosystems, radical
innovation, and entrepreneurial opportunity creation.

2.1. Ecosystems
Building on Moore [5], Nambisan and Baron [6]
defined an innovation ecosystem as a “loosely
interconnected network of companies and other entities
that coevolve capabilities around a shared set of
technologies, knowledge, or skills, and work
cooperatively and competitively to develop new
products and services” (p. 1071). Ecosystems are not
necessarily tied to a coherent and bounded architecture
comprising interoperable technologies. Instead,
ecosystems consist of a hub firm, partners, user
communities, and other stakeholders that offer
complementary innovations across different and even
competing platforms. In ecosystems, the partnering
firms have their own logics and innovation trajectories.
The various actors gain innovation leverage that comes
from learning about each other’s activities and from
sharing resources, including mindshare in terms of a
common purpose [8]. Innovation ecosystems facilitate
the creation of new industries and radical goods and
services, and they potentially reduce the cost and
increase the profitability of innovation [8], [9].
Research on ecosystems has predominantly focused
on large and incumbent organizations as orchestrators
or hub firms. The focus has been on leadership, control
of critical resources, and value appropriation within a
technology-based hub firm that has market power [8].
Adner [15] emphasized the need for tight control to
manage interdependence and integration risks.
Ecosystems can spawn much entrepreneurial activity
by lowering the costs and risks, because the central
player provides incentives to its partners to “co-evolve,
align their goals and activities, and further bond
themselves to one another” [16, p. 220]. The literature
limits the role of entrepreneurial firms as partners, or
complementors, in ecosystems [8]–[10], rather than as
anchors instigating, leading, and orchestrating
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ecosystems. New ventures are encouraged to connect
to ecosystems but not to create the ecosystems
themselves [6].
Hence, the emergence of entrepreneurial
ecosystems might be argued by some researchers to be
conceptually and theoretically anomalous. First,
ecosystems are seen as networks that are “the product
of a long and evolutionary process that defines
relationships among industry players” [16, p. 219]. The
entrepreneurial firm’s need for a short-term focus for
survival runs counter to this long and evolutionary
perspective of an ecosystem. Second, building an
ecosystem requires flexibility and adaptability, but new
ventures are known to be prone to rigidity and
overconfidence [16]. Third, to avoid a well-established
and resourced incumbent from entering and crowding
out the innovation space, the venture needs to target
risky and bold emergent innovation areas that are too
far from the interests and capabilities of incumbents.
Zahra and Nambisan [16] argued that for an
entrepreneurial firm in an ecosystem pursuing radical
opportunities is a must, even in the absence of market
potential.

2.2. Radical Innovation
Recently, Lyytinen Yoo, and Boland [17] proposed
a new organizing form for radical digital innovation,
created by the distributed, fluid, editable, and
configurable nature of digital technologies. The new
form is an anarchic innovation network. Such networks
consist of “a heterogeneous pool of actors and tools…
[but] in the absence of hierarchical control and
presence of high levels of knowledge heterogeneity”
[17, p. 59]. In an anarchic network, control is
distributed throughout the network as each autonomous
entity (e.g., firm, community, partnership) pursues
innovations that make sense for its innovation
trajectories. A plethora of different innovations is
produced—so-called wakes [18]. Each wake comprises
its own technologies, practices, structures, and
strategies. As these wakes interact, much disruption
and overlap occur, but in addition, trading zones
emerge where intercalating innovations give rise to the
next set of wakes. The trading zones promote
“negotiations, collaboration, and learning through
mutual perspective making and taking” [18, p. 635].
Similar to wakes, Majchrzak et al. argued that a
“quantum leap in insight” [19, p. 14] can occur when
participants in the innovation process maintain their
own distinctive work processes, but structures and
processes are also put in place that “facilitate the
confluence of participatory ‘spurts’ of innovation.”
One key aspect of anarchic networks described by
Lyytinen et al [17] is that they are not designed ex ante

because the knowledge resources needed for
innovation are not known a priori. Rather, anarchic
networks emerge through interactions among various
heterogeneous
partnerships
and
collaboration
opportunities. But neither Lyytinen et al. [17] nor
Majchrzak et al. [19] address the challenges of an
entrepreneurial firm in emerging a radical innovation
network. How to formulate a rich landscape of
opportunities so that a search for heterogeneous needsolution pairs can take place?

2.3. Entrepreneurial Opportunities
Entrepreneurship is defined as “the pursuit of
opportunity beyond the resources you currently
control” [20, p. 1], and opportunity is a “future
situation which is deemed desirable and feasible” [21,
p. 23]. While traditionally it was assumed that “there is
no entrepreneurial opportunity without customer
demand” [22, p. 1494], now such demand is so
fragmented, fluid, and rapidly changing, that
opportunities are created by entrepreneurs embedding
themselves in real-time customer “conversations” [23].
But such conversations assume that there is some
certainty in terms of relevant user communities. In the
early stage ecosystem aiming for markets and service
categories that do not yet exist, there is high
uncertainty about customers and technologies for
interaction and engagement. There are also
uncertainties regarding potential business partners and
how to mobilize their resources and enact opportunities
for innovation wakes that would then bring about
additional business partners to the network to
experiment, play, and engage in other forms of
exploration [18].
Some form of probing might provoke diverse
reactions and encourage interactions and experiences
that transcend current limits of the innovation
landscape in an entrepreneurial ecosystem. In human
interaction design, the concept of probing is deployed
to open hidden and invisible territories and embrace
uncertainty and poetic possibilities. Probing (or probes)
is an engagement strategy that involves provocation,
ambiguity, absurdity, opacity, inspiration, and pleasure
[24], [25]. Probes involve a provocative act or artifact
that is novel and rich. Probes deliberately challenge
taken-for-granted assumptions, norms, and rational
thought. The provocations instigate inspirational and
emotional responses, creating a dialogue and a
common language with users that result in “a kind of
intimate distance that can be a fruitful standpoint for
new design ideas” [26, p. 55]. Such inspirational data
from probing is not expected to be analyzed but rather
stimulate possibilities. While the provocation is
intentional,
the
inspirational
responses
are
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indeterminant. As McDougall and Fels [14, p. 57]
wrote “Probes are instruments that are metaphorically
based on the concept of sending probes into the
complete unknown of outerspace and then waiting for
data that may or may not come back to try to make
sense of it without assuming what it might be or where
it comes from.” Probing does not assume that the target
user group is known and it does not test any
hypotheses. Hence, it is different from many prevailing
methods such as the minimum viable product [27].
The earliest form of probing was cultural probing.
This is a discovery process to be used when users
might not know their own needs or desires, and
through which designers might pose their own
expectancies and users are faced with novel,
aesthetically rich artifacts [25], [28]. Gaver et al. [25]
were adamant that probes are not analyzed as rational
processes to filter out the subjectivity in the responses
on which the probe is seeking to shed insight. Probing
is a rather broad concept with many different variations
[2], [24]. As probing relies on eccentric observations, it
has remained elusive and poorly understood, outside
the design fields.
To summarize, while the reviewed literature
provides insight into ecosystems, radical innovation,
and pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities, we note a
lack of knowledge about what might happen at the
intersection of these areas. The literature on
ecosystems has considered early ventures to be
participants—not hubs of ecosystems. While the
research on radical innovation adds to the knowledge
on how different firms in anarchic networks
autonomously pursue their digital innovation
trajectories, it offers little elaboration on how an
entrepreneurial firm entices these autonomous firms to
join the ecosystem in the face of high uncertainty. The
literature on entrepreneurial opportunity formation has
focused on the articulation of market and customer
aspirations and technology opportunities through social
information, but less when markets, customers, and
technologies are all indeterminant. For a newly formed
entrepreneurial firm, the question follows: How does
an entrepreneurial firm grow an ecosystem for radical
innovation?
In addressing this question, we structure our
analysis around digital initiatives that may enact as
open-ended probes. These initiatives involve digital
technologies that are associated with equifinality [13]:
The same user need can be addressed via different
technological means. In other words, because of the
decoupling of information from technologies (i.e.,
resource liquefaction) [3], digital objects can be
rendered in nearly an infinite number of ways. For
example, a sports fan can have a virtual, immersive,

and personalized experience via mobile video, 360°
video, augmented reality, or virtual reality.
Initiatives serving as probes can expand the
landscape by generating new cognitive and social
translations [17]. Cognitive dynamics “form a
generative dance of knowledge identification, sourcing,
creation, dissemination and validation” [17, p. 56].
Social translation involves redefining and negotiating
the meaning of innovations, identities, and roles
through interactions, which leads to sense-making and
sense-giving within a web of relationships. The more
radical the innovation, “the more dynamic the ebb and
flow of knowledge and perspectives” [17, p. 56] and
the more likely are tensions among different actors.
These tensions can expand the space of the ecosystem
for new opportunities as different social interactions
are contextualized and threaded [23].

3. Method
Our research was inspired by our reading of a
Financial Times article on Formula E (FE). 1 FE was
the first international fully-electric racing series,
sanctioned by the Fédération Internationale de
l’Automobile (FIA). The organization behind the new
championship was Formula E Group, which had
obtained its 25-year license from the FIA in 2012.
Although the FIA acted as a governing body in terms
of safety and fair competition for several motorsports,
Formula E acted autonomously in pursuing innovations
and building its ecosystem.
After observing FE’s activities for a couple of
months, we learned that it engaged in rampant
exploration of the innovation space, evidenced by
having launched a variety of digital initiatives and
building a remarkable ecosystem in the process. After
only two years, the ecosystem included established
firms and tech startups in the automotive,
entertainment, finance, luxury, and logistics industries,
as well as vibrant online user communities, such as
those on Reddit and Facebook. The innovation network
around FE was ever-expanding, with new (team)
sponsors or partnerships announced almost on a
weekly basis, rendering a revelatory case study.
Because of our “general wonderment” of what the
venture had accomplished in a short amount of time,
we felt the need to delve more deeply into FE’s
ecosystem and activities by conducting a case study. A
case study approach is appropriate for examining the
emergence of a new phenomenon, when the context is
complex and dynamic and the research question is of
the type, “why” or “how” [29], [30].
1

Mitchell, Tom, “China’s Formula E electric car circuit plugs into
desire for clean air,” Financial Times, December 8th 2015.

4739

3.1. Case context
For the FIA, FE provided an opportunity to
promote clean energy and sustainability, issues for
which FIA’s flagship championship, Formula 1, was
often criticized. FE had set itself to challenge the
notions not only of pollution, but also of elitism and
sexism perceptions in motorsports. After two years of
developing, testing, and demonstrating the electric
single-seater, as well as engaging teams, drivers, and
sponsors, the inaugural season was kicked off in
Beijing in September 2014. Although some aspects of
FE were the same as in other racing series (e.g., two
drivers per team), the championship was unique in
several ways: The cars were fully electric; races,
referred to as ePrixs, were held in different city centers
around the globe instead of on dedicated race tracks,
which was possible because of the lack of air pollution
and low noise levels produced; and qualifying and the
race itself were held on a single day, instead of
multiple days.
Moreover, FE aimed to transform prototypical
industrial-era motorsports for baby boomers into a
digital-era sports category for millennials, who had
shown little interest in motorsports so far. Millennials
represented a highly diverse and disparate group that
had fickle values and interests. Not only were they
generationally, culturally, and knowledge-wise distant
from the conventional notions of motorsports fans, but
they also showed little interest in driving or owning a
car. Hence, FE faced significant uncertainty about who
potential fans for the new sports series could be. Yet,
positioned as the next-generation motorsports for the
digitally literate millennials, FE sought to attract
attention by launching different digital initiatives to
engage potential fans in transforming how motorsports
was experienced, performed, and defined. In particular,
during the first two years of race operations, FE had
launched various initiatives, leveraging digital
technology such as social media, gaming, virtual
reality, and artificial intelligence.

3.2. Data collection and analysis
We collected data on FE, its ecosystem, and its
digital initiatives from several sources. Gathering
multiple sources is generally considered to be
important in case study research because doing so can
highlight different perspectives, adding to the complete
picture of the case [30]. We initially gathered publicly
available data from FE, such as their press releases and
news and social media channels. We furthermore
examined FE’s financial statements and annual reports.
In addition, we collected data from third-party sources,
such as news websites and fan forums and

communities (on Reddit and Facebook). In addition,
we analyzed interviews with key people at FE (e.g.,
CEO Alejandro Agag and CMO Ali Russell) that
appeared in news journals, in magazines, and on
websites. Furthermore, we attended the Long Beach,
CA (US) and London (UK) ePrixs in person, for a firsthand experience of all of the on- and side-track
activities. Also, 16 fans were briefly interviewed at
Long Beach and 10 at London about how they
experienced the event, what digital channels they used
during and in-between races, and how they felt about
the fan engagement initiatives at FE. One of the
authors served as the administrator of a local Facebook
FE fan site. Finally, we conducted an interview with
Tom Halls, Head of Digital at FE, about the various
digital initiatives and the role of feedback from social
channels.
We organized and analyzed this data based on the
timeline (i.e., origin, planning phase, season 1, season
2, future plans), as well as based on different structures
and issues (e.g., key actors, regulation changes,
partners, fan engagement initiatives, support series,
sponsors, sustainability). Several distinct themes
emerged from the analysis: digital entrepreneurship,
innovation ecosystems, hybridity (blend of physical
and digital worlds), process virtualization, fan
entertainment and engagement, and environmental
issues. As a next step, we developed a descriptive
teaching case on FE, touching on all of these themes,
yet focusing primarily on FE’s digital fan engagement
initiatives on and off the track.
At the starting point, we had no idea that probing
would emerge as a practice that helped to explain a
pattern of behavior across the initiatives. However, as
we triangulated our observations with the service
ecosystem and radical innovation literatures, some
anomalies appeared to surface. To understand what
was happening at FE, we entered an iterative process
of data collection, analysis, and literature study. We
used several structures to arrange the information, such
as addressing the questions why, how, and for whom is
FE launching these initiatives, and examining the
inputs, processes, and outputs of the digital initiatives.
We performed our analysis without predispositions but
with an open mind for unexpected themes or patterns,
allowing an engagement strategy, probing, to emerge.

4. Findings
Because of ample knowledge heterogeneity and the
autonomy of action by various actors, FE’s ecosystem
appears to resemble an anarchic network form. The
case is notable in the sense that we see an innovation
ecosystem at an early stage, when anarchic forms
might be particularly common to create radical
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innovations. The ecosystem is not preplanned but
rather is evolving, as is the vision of what a nextgeneration motor sport could be. In this section, we
present a number of initiatives FE had launched to
simultaneously demarcate and expand the innovation
space in terms of (1) engaging sports fans in digital
experiences, (2) redefining fan engagement in sports
performance, and (3) inventing new sports
competitions and categories. We analyze the social
interactions these initiatives engendered (on Facebook,
Twitter, and Reddit) and the sequence of managerial
decisions at FE that further pushed and poked at the
limits of the innovation landscape.

4.1. Engaging sports fans in digital experiences
FE was interested in the exploration of digital user
behavior that would allow for an experience of
motorsports in a fan-centric, immersive way—
especially for those fans who could not attend the race
physically. Hence, FE was pioneering 360° videos and
virtual reality in the sports world, which virtually put
the fan in the driver seat. FE management commented:
“99% of the fans cannot attend the race, which is
conventionally thought of as the best fan experience.
We believe, however, that remote digitally-enabled
immersive engagement can go beyond the real-life fan
experience.”
In particular, via the mobile app and in partnership
with 360 Racing, FE enabled fans to choose among
360° video live streams from onboard four cars, as well
as from fixed positions, during the race. At the same
time, FE was developing virtual reality re-creations of
the races in collaboration with Virtually Live. More
specifically, computer-generated images of the tracks
and the cars were combined with live data about car
position, speed, movement, etc. As a result, fans could
choose any position around the track, as well as any
driver’s car, and see what is happening as the race is
taking place. These experiences were available live,
but also were offered for download, for deferred
consumption. Other 360° videos, available on
YouTube and Facebook, and virtual reality
experiences, available on the Oculus, HTC Vive, and
PlayStation Virtual Reality platforms, included a pit
stop clip, as well as behind-the-scenes footage of the
paddock and teams’ garages.
The social interactions that ensued, uncovered how
differentiated the community was. Some fans were
enthusiastic about these initiatives, and their reactions
confirmed FE’s claim that it had potential to go beyond
the real-life experience, as this fan quote illustrates:
“It’s cool to wander into garages and areas that are
usually cordoned off to fans.” Other fans identified
unexpected uses of the footage, as one fan commented

after attending the race in person: “When you are
attending the race, you can easily miss out on some
pivotal action. With these technologies, [you] can
replay exciting and controversial moments, from
whatever angle of your choosing.” However, the
equifinality of digital technology instigated
conversations within the fan community, as this quote
illustrates: “I could see the point of the 360 degree onboard videos, but having a computer-generated image
version of the race seems utterly redundant, when you
can just watch the real thing.” Finally, some saw the
experience that current technology offered as limited:
“Motorsports is a highly sensory experience, it’s not
just about the sights and the noise, it also involves
smelling and touching the cars. Moreover, this is a
social event, yet these immersive technologies provide
primarily private experiences.”
These interactions provided FE management with
new openings to further transform and augment the
digital fan experience. Also, through direct interaction
with the fan community on Twitter (see Figure 1), FE
management (Tom Halls, Head of Digital at FE) found
additional paths for innovation: “Fans are asking for
access to the drivers’ live audio streams. Obviously,
this is very sensitive as team strategies are discussed
there, yet this is the kind of disruption we embrace in
this championship.” FE sought to expand the digital
fan experience even further, as management wondered
whether fans might be able to interact in real-time with
drivers during the race.

Figure 1. FE mobile app feature poll on Twitter

4.2. Redefining fan engagement in sports
performance
FE was redefining how fans could be engaged in
the performance aspect of motorsports. Through the
FanBoost initiative, fans were enabled to affect the
race outcome in an unprecedented way, directly
influencing the performance of drivers through a
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crowdsourcing capability called FanBoost. In
particular, when fans through crowdsourcing supported
their favorite driver with their vote, the latter could get
extra power during the race; the three drivers with the
most votes were awarded the FanBoost. FE
management commented: “We are merging social
media and motorsport in unprecedented ways; this is
truly gamifying the sport!”
Fans could vote via social media (Twitter,
Instagram), using specific hashtags. However, fans
could also cast their vote through less open
mechanisms, such as FE’s mobile application and
website. In particular, fans were allowed one vote per
mechanism per day. Moreover, FE displayed the
ranking of FanBoost votes, but not the actual voting
numbers for each driver.
For this initiative, tensions and divided perspectives
among fans and drivers clearly emerged. On the one
hand, FanBoost generated emotional and personal
interactions between drivers and fans, as revealed in
this fan quote: “I FanBoosted Bruno Senna on
Instagram, and he said thank you for voting. I felt
great because he used it to pass Prost in the race!”
However, another fan commented: “FanBoost has
nothing to do with sport, racing, or driving. It is a
pathetic attempt to make motor racing more like a
video game to draw in the moronic PS3 generation.”
Moreover, what was trending among fans and
drivers was the legitimacy of FanBoost, and the alleged
use of bots that generate automated messages to
artificially increase votes. As a result, the drivers had a
love–hate relationship with FanBoost, as this driver
quote after Season 2 illustrated: “I like FanBoost, and I
think it is a really great feature to have in the
championship. However, the voting system should
change to just votes via social media, which makes the
system very easy to monitor. What I like about sport is
a fair way of competing. Cheating in any way, for
instance by buying votes for FanBoost, is wrong.
Formula E is in discussions about how to improve it
for next season, and they have all the support from the
drivers as we want to keep it for Season 3 and
beyond.” (FE had already adapted the mechanisms
between Seasons 1 and 2, such that the influence of it
on performance decreased.)
By listening to social interactions, FE also was able
to adapt other aspects of the mechanism. In particular,
the voting window opened 12 days prior to each ePrix,
at which point teams and drivers started reaching out to
their fan base because they realized the fan support
could help them win races. FE management
commented: “We have to balance the stimulation of
excitement prior to the race with the risk of
oversaturation.” Moreover, whereas in Season 1,
voting ended before the start of the race, in Season 2,

FE allowed voting six minutes into the race. FE
commented: “We learned that fans disliked the fact
that if their favorite driver crashed in the first corner,
they basically wasted their vote. So by extending voting
six minutes into the race, we now see that if a crash
happens, fans shift their vote.”
Finally, what often happened was that local
drivers—those coming from countries where the ePrix
was held—gained momentum and won the FanBoost.
FE learned that different voting mechanisms were used
in different regions. As FanBoost became increasingly
popular among fans, FE engaged Telescope, which
supports real-time viewer voting for television shows,
such as American Idol, to help in counting the votes,
adding to the legitimacy perceptions of FanBoost.

4.3. Inventing new sports competitions and
categories
FE also pushed the boundaries in terms of defining
new sports competitions and categories. In fact, with
the first, fully electric racing series, it had already
authored a new category of sport. Moreover, FE started
exploring eSports opportunities midway through
Season 2, to stimulate the interest of potential fans who
had never bought or even driven a real car but who
might be familiar with racing from video games. It set
up two “RaceOff Exhibition Events,” at which fans
could qualify for a virtual race with two professional
FE drivers. After the event, FE gathered feedback from
fans—for instance, through Twitter (see Figure 2).
According to FE management: “The events were a big
hit; based on this success and the positive buzz around
it, we decided to launch additional initiatives in the
gaming space.”

Figure 2. Gathering feedback on RaceOff
Events
FE built on this gaming experience in two ways.
First, the “eRace” was launched—a track-side event to
fill in the time slot between qualifying and the race. In
particular, the fan who set the fastest time on the race
simulators during the day had a chance to compete
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with professional Formula E drivers during the eRace.
Also, the events followed the rhythm of the ePrixs,
resulting in an ebb and flow of interest. The most
unique aspect of it seemed to be the emotional
connection made possible by the move from solitary to
relational participation, as one fan notes: “It’s great
that I can go from racing in my bedroom to racing
against a Formula E driver who won last week.”
Second, FE announced a stage for the best gamers
worldwide to compete with each other. In particular,
the “RaceOff Pro Series” involved fastest-lap time
competitions among gamers before each ePrix. The
fastest drivers were invited to participate in a virtual
race the day before the ePrix, and the winners of these
virtual races were invited to an all-expenses paid trip to
the grand finale, held in a custom-built eSports arena in
London where the final ePrix also took place. The
downside of this initiative, as social interactions
indicated, was that it required users to have the Xbox
console, which was only one of the three main video
game console makers, along with Sony PlayStation and
Nintendo Wii. The market is equally divided among
the three, and this exclusiveness was not in line with
the expectations of the gaming community. In addition,
gaming is increasingly moving to mobile and virtual
reality, which might provide an opportunity for FE to
be a trailblazer in terms of these technologies as well.
Moreover, through eSports, FE was exploring the
limitations of simulated racing. Its 2017 plan included
setting up a virtual-only race among its real drivers,
and FE management indicated such races might
provide points for the championship in the future. They
also have been contemplating a blending of the two
worlds and having virtual and real-world drivers
compete in the same race.
Another sports category in which FE was pushing
the boundaries is driverless car races. In Season 3,
kicked off in Fall 2016, FE included plans to launch
Roborace, as a support series for FE. FE management
commented: “Others could have announced a
driverless car championship, but they probably didn’t
dare to. For Formula E, this kind of bold initiative
makes sure we explore possible directions for the
future. In particular, this [move] provides tremendous
opportunity for excitement as there are no concerns
about driver safety. Moreover, there could be
competitions of [hu]man-vs.-machine.”
In the Roborace series, ten teams would compete,
each using the same car. For the design of the car (see
Figure 3), automotive futurist Daniel Simon was
engaged. Simon, known for his vehicle designs in
blockbuster movies, such as Tron: Legacy and Captain
America, commented that “the Roborace is as much
about competition as it is entertainment. Therefore,
and quite unusual in today’s racing world, beauty was

very high on our agenda and we worked hard to merge
the best performance with stunning styling.”

Figure 3. Robocar
Denis Sverdlov, CEO of Roborace, added:
“Roborace will provide its viewers with a fascinating
spectacle as the world’s best minds will compete with
each other to create the fastest and most efficient race
cars around. Now, the whole racing team will be at the
center of attention throughout the competition,
whereas previously attention could only focus on
drivers.” Three types of teams were to be competing:
traditional car manufacturers, technology firms (e.g.,
Google and Apple), and crowd-sourced teams. In
particular, to explore opportunities for engaging fans,
the public—especially teams of coders from tech
startups and universities—will be able to submit
algorithms, which will then race against the other
teams.
Also, given the tension associated with car
crashes—a spectacle for fans, yet potentially creating
distrust in the technology—Roborace is expected to
simultaneously explore two formats of Roborace
competition. Sverdlov explains: “One will be about the
safety and the other one will be called ‘fight mode,’
where the cars can behave quite aggressively. We
really want to involve our technology partners to work
out the right balance between safety and the show.”
The announcement of the new sports category
already had caused a lot of stir within the community,
as the quote from this skeptical fan illustrates 2: “If
every car is plugging away lap after neatly
programmed lap, where will the action be? You can’t
intimidate machinery. You can’t get up in the mirrors
of a robot and make them sweat by hanging right off
their bumper until they either move over or screw up.”

5. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we identified gaps at the intersection of
the literatures on ecosystems, radical innovation, and
2

http://blackflag.jalopnik.com/who-do-you-root-for-when-no-onesdriving-an-autonomous-1768409635
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entrepreneurial opportunity formation. To address the
literature’s missing perspective in early-stage
entrepreneurial ecosystems, the research question was:
“How does an entrepreneurial firm grow an emerging
ecosystem for radical innovation?” We have analyzed
this question in the context of a new venture, Formula
E in the sports and entertainment industry, that is
reinventing the motorsports world with digital
technologies.
Our triangulation of the observed patterns from FE’s
initiatives and the literature advanced a concept of
entrepreneurial probing. We define entrepreneurial
probing to follow the key elements of probing in the
human interaction design literature. Probing constitutes
of deliberate provocation and open-ended dialog and
conversation about need-solution pairs. Entrepreneurial
probing shares the goal of cultural probes that focus on
uncovering needs of target groups that the designer is
unfamiliar with. Entrepreneurial probing also includes
technological probing that makes users aware of
emerging technological solutions, trends and
developments and gathers social information regarding
their acceptance [2]. As entrepreneurial probing
addresses need-solution pairs, the core notion of
opportunity formation is maintained in the engagement
strategy.
Just as probes in general, entrepreneurial probes do
not aim to seek general or average characteristics, to
validate expectations, or to “solve” a particular
problem, but rather to discover what previously was
invisible or hidden. They aim to explore the surprises,
unexpected uses, and unintended consequences and
tensions produced from people’s real, lived-with
experiences. Hence, probes do not narrow the scope of
innovation or its meaning but rather expand it.
Entrepreneurial probing aims to overcome takenfor-granted assumptions and to open up new
possibilities in an emerging ecosystem. FE challenged
the notions of how motorsports are experienced,
performed, and defined. What we observed at FE is
that, through its initiatives, it did not try to converge
and validate design requirements or understand or
proclaim commonalities of possible fan and customer
communities; rather, it sought to provoke new
interaction, reflection, and debate and thereby to
increase uncertainty. In particular, FE discovered huge
variations in reactions on its initiatives. For instance,
eSports and Roborace invigorated tensions among fans
about what the essence of motorsports was, and the
immersive fan-centric experiences revealed what fans
were looking for when attending a race.
Entrepreneurial probing engendered open-ended
dialog and discussion that linked to social trends and
diverse user communities, as well as fueled tensions
among and between communities. Platforms for

probing at FE included Facebook groups, updates and
comments, Twitter posts and polls, Web Forum
interactions, Blog posts, and wikis. Through probing,
social trends were identified at FE, such as the
specifics of the FanBoost mechanism and its potential
manipulation. Probing provided inspirations about
unfolding developments that lead to entry of new
actors into the ecosystem. For instance, the
introduction of Roborace brought established
universities into the ecosystem.
Besides the deliberate and emergent elements, we
assert that entrepreneurial probing addresses both
needs and solutions at the same time. Entrepreneurial
probing encourages ambiguity and involves pushing
boundaries of innovation landscapes so that diverse
actors can then pursue heterogeneous need-solution
pairs that fit with their own unique innovation
trajectories. Entrepreneurial probing can expand a
landscape for diverse user communities including leadusers [31]. A case in point is FE’s endeavors in
eSports, in which it motivates professional gamers to
compete against real-life racers.
While probing can be thought of as a form of
exploratory learning, it lacks some of the aspects often
associated with exploration [32]–[35]. The literature
argues for highly selective exploration by a new
venture with limited resources. Exploration should be
tightly focused on an identified problem. However, we
see a broad range of initiatives at FE, many of which
have little in common. The exploration literature also
argues that to gain value from exploration, there needs
to be integration of new knowledge. However, we saw
little evidence of integration of knowledge across
initiatives at FE. In addition, probing assumes
engagement including co-creation that is not
necessarily present in exploratory learning. Also,
entrepreneurial
probing
does
not
involve
experimentation, which comprises developing a
hypothesis and systematic evaluation [36]. Instead,
entrepreneurial probing is about “feeling around,” or
poking for interest or attraction in previously
unfamiliar territories.
In this paper, we have advanced entrepreneurial
probing as a concept that we speculate might
generalize to other early-stage entrepreneurial
ecosystems. We hope we have identified a potential
research area, probing at emergent entrepreneurial
ecosystems, that can trigger subsequent theorizing and
systematic and rigorous empirical inquiries.
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